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NOTES
Would I Lie to You? The Sixth Circuit
Joins the "Exculpatory No"
Controversy in United States v. Steele
Robert Steele sold two parcels of land to Thomas Duerr, who
paid for the land with proceeds from drug sales.' To protect Duerr
from Internal Revenue Service investigation concerning the source
of his income, Steele agreed to record on the sales records a
purchase price of $40,000 instead of the actual price of $80,000.2
When an IRS agent contacted Steele and requested copies of the
documents, Steele sent them-false information unchanged.3 When
Duerr subsequently disclosed the misrepresentation to the IRS,
Steele was charged and later convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 4
for submitting false information to a federal agency.5
In a 2-1 decision,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed Steele's conviction, stating that Steele's ac-
tions fell within the "exculpatory no" exception to section 1001. 7
In other words, the court held that Steele's actions were taken in
response to a fear of self-incrimination within the context of a
criminal investigation and were therefore not punishable under
section 1001.8
The reversal was short-lived. The Sixth Circuit granted an en
banc rehearing9 and vacated its earlier decision,10 refusing to adopt
, See United States v. Steele, 896 F.2d 998, 999 (6th Cir.) [hereinafter Steele ],
vacated, 933 F.2d 1313 (6th Cir. 1990).
2 Id. at 999.
3Id. at 1000.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); see infra text accompanying note 22.
5 Steele I, 896 F.2d at 1000.
6 Judges Krupansky and Brown were in the majority; Judge Ryan dissented.
Steele I, 896 F.2d at 1005.
Id. The exculpatory no exception removes certain actions from the scope of section
1001. See infra notes 48-126 and accompanying text.
9 United States v. Steele, 909 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1990).
10 See United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313 (6th Cir.) [hereinafter Steele I], cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 303 (1991).
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the exculpatory no doctrine under which Steele's prior conviction
had been overturned" and reinstating his section 1001 conviction.1 2
However, the exculpatory no doctrine did not exactly "go out like
a lamb"; there were two concurring opinions and three dissents. 3
The disagreement among the Sixth Circuit judges parallels the
disagreement among the federal circuit courts that have interpreted
section 1001. The breadth of this statute has sparked concern about
the potential for government abuse, 4 yet some courts believe that
separation of powers prohibits them from placing limits where
Congress chose to create none.15 Therefore, inconsistency and con-
troversy have arisen as courts attempt to strike a balance between
the power and intention of Congress to protect government agen-
cies and the role of the judiciary in the interpretation of legislation
and protection of constitutional rights.
This Note analyzes the exculpatory no doctrine in light of the
Steele II decision. It first examines the language and history of
section 1001, the breadth of which is the source of the dilemma.' 6
Next, the origins, applications and variations of the exculpatory
no doctrine are discussed.' 7 Finally, Steele 11 is critically analyzed
to show the most reasonable response to the judicial dilemma in
the shadow of congressional silence.'
I. SECTION 1001-THE SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY
Because the language and history of section 1001 weighed heav-
ily in the Steele I court's decision to reject the exculpatory no
doctrine, 9 an analysis of the statutory language and its legislative
history is critical.
" Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1321.
12 Id. at 1322.
1' Concurring opinions were written by Judges Nelson and Wellford; Chief Judge
Merritt and Judges Brown and Martin each wrote dissenting opinions.
" See, e.g., United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that
if section 1001 were read literally, "virtually any false statement.., could be penalized as
a felony"); see also Giles A. Birch, Note, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies
and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1273 (1990) (discussing abuse of section 1001
by federal police in post-arrest interrogations).
" See Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1321; United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 (5th
Cir. 1974).
16 See infra notes 19-47 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 48-127 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 128-54 and accompanying text.




It is well-recognized that the plain meaning of a statute controls
its interpretation, unless such interpretation would result in an
application "demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the draft-
ers." 20 The language of section 1001 is incredibly broad, 2' and its
plain meaning consequently sets rather wide parameters:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies,
conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.?
The statute does not discriminate among agencies or agency
functions; it applies to any matter within the jurisdiction of any
agency or department. Therefore, an application of section 1001
based solely on its plain meaning will inevitably be expansive. The
Supreme Court, as Steele II points out, has recognized the sweeping
effect of the statutory language of section 1001.21 Yet, when given
the opportunity to limit the reach of section 1001, the Court has
consistently refused. In United States v. Rodgers,24 the Court in
addressing section 1001 stated that "[r]esolution of ... whether a
statute should sweep broadly or narrowly is for Congress."2s The
Court further noted that although the language of section 1001 is
broad, it is neither ambiguous nor unjust.26
20 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
21 Whether such a broad plain meaning creates results "at odds with the intentions
of the drafters" will be discussed in the context of the statute's legislative history. See infra
note 46 and accompanying text.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (emphasis added).
2 See Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1317 (citing United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475
(1984)).
- 466 U.S. 475 (1984).
21 Id. at 484.
See id. The Rodgers Court also rejected an attempt by the Eighth Circuit to limit
section 1001 through a narrow interpretation of the term "jurisdiction" in the statute. The
Court held that the term should not be given "a narrow or technical meaning." Id. at 480
(quoting Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70 (1969)); see also United States v. Gilliland,
312 U.S. 86, 91 (1941) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1940)-the precursor to section 1001-
and concluding that the statute was not invalid for indefiniteness); Timothy I. Nicholson,
Note, Just Say "No': An Analysis of the "Exculpatory No" Doctrine, 39 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CorrMEp. L. 225, 232 n.37 (1991) ("Fifteen petitions for writs of certiorari have
been denied without a single dissenting rationale offered in cases where the defendant raised
the 'exculpatory no' defense.").
1992-93]
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It has also been argued that section 1001 is a criminal statute
and should therefore be interpreted narrowly.27 The Sixth Circuit
refused to adopt this narrow approach, responding that the rule
of construction does not purport to rewrite the statute "in complete
disregard of the purpose of the legislature. ' 28
B. Legislative Evolution
Courts often look beyond the express language of a statute to
determine the purpose of the legislature, necessitating an inquiry
into the legislative history of the statute. 29 Here, a thorough ex-
amination of the legislative history of section 1001 supports the
contention that Congress' purpose in drafting the current statute
was not a narrow one.
The history of section 1001 has been one of constant expan-
sion, 0 its parameters having been continually broadened since its
1863 origin.' The 1863 Act was created by Congress to deter false
claims against the government by military personnel. 32 The Act
prohibited the making of any "false, fictitious, or fraudulent"
claim against the government "or any department or officer
thereof."3 3 The Act also punished those military personnel making
false statements in relation to these claims, defining them as:
any person in such forces or service who shall, for the purpose
of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment of
such claim, make, use, or cause to be made or used, any false
bill, receipt, voucher, entry, roll, account, claim, statement, cer-
2 See Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1317 (recognizing the existence of the argument); see also
United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955) (stating that the canon requiring strict
interpretation of criminal statutes is a "proposition which calls for the citation of no
authority").
28 Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1317 (quoting Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 510).
- See infra notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
"o The history of section 1001 was traced in Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 504-08.
1' Id. (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (original false claims act)).
32 In Bramblett, the Court observed that under the 1863 Act, it was unlawful for
any person in the land or naval forces of the United States ... [to] make or
cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented for payment or approval
to or by any person or officer in the civil or military service of the United
States, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or
any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious,
or fraudulent.
Id. at 504-05 (quoting 12 Stat. 696).
33 Id. at 505 (quoting 12 Stat. 696).
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tificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain
any false or fraudulent statement or entry.
34
In 1874, the Act was expanded to include "every person" rather
than just military personnel. 35 Various other amendments added
between 1874 and 1934 further broadened the Act:36
The false claims provision was extended to cover corporations in
which the United States held stock; and false statements were
proscribed if made "for the purpose and with the intent of
cheating or defrauding the Government of the United States" as
well as if made for the purpose of obtaining payment of a false
claim. 37
In 1934, in response to the Secretary of the Interior's concern
with "hot oil frauds,"" the "false statements" portion of the
statute was significantly expanded. 39 Congress struck the "cheat-
ing" and "defrauding" language of the old statute and enlarged
the statute to reach false statements or representations "in any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States. "40 According to the Supreme Court, this amendment
"indicated the congressional intent to protect the authorized func-
tions of governmental departments and agencies." '4'
The statute acquired its present form42 in 1948. The false claims
provision was severed43 and the false statements provision became
18 U.S.C. § 1001. The statute retained virtually the same form as
the false statements section of the 1934 statute, with only minor
changes.44
34 Id.
3, Id. (citing Act of Dec. 1, 1873, approved June 22, 1874, R.S. § 5438 (2d ed. 1878)).
36 See id. at 506 n.2.
37 Id. (citing Act of May 30, 1908, ch. 235, 35 Stat. 555).
u "Hot oil frauds" are frauds perpetrated by petroleum producers by falsifying
interstate shipping documents. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 90 (1941). Such
frauds did not fall within the purview of the statute prior to 1934 because there was no
resulting pecuniary loss to the government, i.e., the government was not being "cheated"
or "swindled" as the statute required. Id. at 92-93.
31 Id. at 93-94.
,0 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996.
41 Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93.
42 See supra note 22.
"3 False claims are now punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
14 The statute no longer refers to "corporations in which the United States is a
stockholder," and the phrase "in any matter" was moved to the beginning. The Brambleft
Court refers to these as "housekeeping changes." 348 U.S. at 508.
1992-93]
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Hence, from its 1863 origin, no restrictive language was ever
added to section 1001. In fact, the Bramblett Court, in analyzing
the 1934 amendment, concluded that the congressional records in
no way expressed any desire to limit the statute: 45 "In light of this
Congressional intent, a broad reading of section 1001 would not
arrive at a result 'demonstrably at odds' with congressional intent;
to the contrary, the Court has consistently indicated that the statute
should be construed broadly." 46 Thus, under either theory of stat-
utory interpretation, a broad reading of section 1001 is warranted,
and all indications are that such a reading is precisely what Con-
gress intended.47
Nevertheless, some courts, alarmed by the potential reach of
the statute, have limited the application of section 1001 through
what is now known as the exculpatory no doctrine. Unfortunately,
the application of the doctrine has been anything but uniform, and
its inconsistent application among the federal circuits has resulted
in unpredictability, conflict and judicial legislation.
II. TnE EXCULPATORY No DOCTRINE
The exculpatory no doctrine first appeared in 1955 in a federal
district court in Maryland. 4 Since then, the doctrine has taken on
multiple forms. Some courts have remained true to the roots of
the doctrine, 49 while others have developed much more complex
configurations.5 0 Sadly, the more complex the doctrine has become,
the more it has been manipulated. Not only is there disagreement
as to the appropriate form of the exculpatory no doctrine, but also
as to the proper application of the doctrine. This conflict presents
a disturbing inconsistency that demands clarification.
4S Id. at 507 (referring to S. REP. No. 1202; H.R. REp. No. 1463, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934); congressional debates at 78 CONG. REc. 8136, 11,270, 11,513 (1934)).
46 Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1318 (citing Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 503).
41 Not only does the legislative history of section 1001 support this theory of con-
gressional purpose, but subsequent actions by Congress are consistent as well. For example,
parts of the language of section 1001 have been "borrowed" for use in other statutes.
Amendments to the Grand Jury Disclosure Act, for example, included the clause "for use
in the matter within the jurisdiction of an agency." This language was selected because it
had "already been broadly interpreted in cases involving 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and was
[therefore] selected to avoid listing every conceivable agency proceeding." 131 CONo. REC.
24,476, 24,478 (1985). For further examples, see Nicholson, supra note 26, at 231 n.34.
41 See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
" See infra notes 116-27 and accompanyig text.
10 See infra notes 72-115 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 81
1992-93] EXCULPATORY No
A. The Origins of the Doctrine
1. United States v. Stark
Albert Stark was a construction contractor employed on pro-
jects supported by the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA").51
When he and his partner, Harry Bart, were investigated by the
FBI concerning their connections to the FHA,52 they made a series
of false statements in the form of denials while under oath. 3
Consequently, Stark and Bart were indicted for violation of section
1001.54
The central issue was whether the representations made by the
men were in fact "statements" within the meaning of section
1001. 51 The court concentrated on the legislative history of the
statute, particularly the 1934 amendment, in reaching its decision.5 6
The court concluded that while the "false pecuniary claims" lan-
guage was edited in 1934, the 1934 amendment merely expanded
the statute to "protect governmental agencies from perversion of
their normal functioning. '5 7 The court stated:
The purpose seems to be to protect the government from the
affirmative or aggressive and voluntary actions of persons who
take the initiative, or, in other words, to protect the government
from being the victim of some positive statement, whether written
" Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 191.
'2 The FBI agents were "lawfully detailed ... to investigate irregularities and mis-
conduct of... employees ... employed in the Baltimore insuring office of the FHA ...
and attempts to defraud the Government in the functioning of the Maryland office of the
FHA." Id.
11 Id. Stark and Bart denied giving any money or other type of payments to any FHA
employees; they also denied knowledge of a $500 payment made to an FHA inspector and
returned to either Stark or Bart. Id.
'4 Id. at 192.
11 Id. at 198. The court also dealt with the issue of whether or not the answers given
to the FBI were "in a matter within the jurisdiction of the Agency." Id. at 206. The court
held that, even though the FBI had the power to investigate this matter, they had no
authority to adjudicate, and therefore the matter was not within the "jurisdiction" of the
agency under section 1001. Id. at 206-07.
The notion that "jurisdiction" requires the power to adjudicate was overturned by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984). See supra note 26.
Therefore, this section of the opinion is no longer persuasive. However, the remainder of
the Stark decision-the exculpatory no defense-remalns valid.
56 See Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 199-202. For a detailed examination of the language of
the statute before and after the 1934 amendment, see supra notes 34-45 and accompanying
text.
37 Id. at 205.
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or oral, which has the tendency and effect of perverting its normal
proper activities.18
The court ruled that the representations made by the defendants
were not "statements" within the meaning of the statute. In the
court's view, Congress never intended to punish statements that
were made involuntarily or made for purposes other than "inducing
improper action by the government against others." 9
The Stark court also expressed Fifth Amendment concerns
regarding section 1001, as well as some fears of governmental
abuse.6° The defendants had originally been indicted under charges
of bribery and perjury,6' but these charges were subsequently dis-
missed for error.62 Rather than amend the indictments, the govern-
ment abandoned the bribery and perjury charges and sought section
1001 indictments based on the defendants' prior denials of guilt.63
The court felt that these actions, while not squarely within the
purview of the Fifth Amendment, were nonetheless "inconsistent"
with the spirit of that constitutional provision."
It seems quite inconsistent with our fundamental concepts of
due process in the administration of criminal justice to abandon
charges of bribery and perjury against the defendants, and then
to indict them for previously denying their complicity therein, as
a different separate substantive criminal offense under section
1001. The clear purpose of the section was to operate as a shield
for defense rather than as a sword for attack.6
Thus, the defendants' false statements, which were merely de-
nials, were excepted from conduct constituting a violation of sec-
tion 1001 because "[tihe sweeping generality of the language of
section 1001 ... requires caution in applying it to particular situa-
11 Id. (emphasis added).
39 Id. at 206. In its interpretation of the term "statement," the court linked it closely
with the term "representations," also used in the statute, which "connotes the kind of a
statement that is intended to be acted on by the person to whom made." Id. at 205.
Id. at 207.
Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 207.
62 Id. The indictments were dismissed due to error in the pleading and misjoinder of
persons.
6d.
" Id. "The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself in criminal cases.... I cannot think that such an application [of
section 1001] could have been within the intent of Congress." Id.
65 Id. (emphasis added).
[VOL. 81
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tions." 66 This "caution" exercised by the Stark court has been
followed in a series of subsequent judicial opinions in the form of
the exculpatory no doctrine.
2. Paternostro v. United States
The exculpatory no doctrine was ushered into the courts of
appeals by the Fifth Circuit in the case of Paternostro v. United
States.67 Paternostro was accused of making false statements to an
IRS agent investigating unreported income from police graft. 68
After an extensive review of previous district court cases addressing
the issue,69 the Fifth Circuit held that Paternostro's statements did
not fall within the parameters of section 1001 because (1) they
were not related to any claim against the government, (2) he did
not initiate any statement, and (3) his representations were not
calculated to prevent the legitimate functions of Government. 70 The
" Id.
-7 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962).
"Id. at 300.
69 The Fifth Circuit looked first to Stark, but also analyzed the following cases:
United States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Defendant gave a false,
oral denial to an Internal Revenue Agent. The court held that section 1001 did not apply
because the statement could not possibly have "perverted the authorized function" of the
agent, which is exactly what the statute is designed to protect:
While the Special Agent may have been disappointed that defendant
would not truthfully answer himself into a felony conviction, we fail to see
that his investigative function was in any way perverted. The only possible
effect of exculpatory denials however false, received from a suspect such as
defendant is to stimulate the agent to carry out his function.
Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 303.04 (quoting Philippe, 173 F. Supp. at 584).
United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The court held that false
denials made to the FBI under oath were not chargeable under section 1001. However, the
court also added:
But can it be said that when an accused person, a potential defendant,
a suspect, grants an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation an interview
and, in reply to an incriminating question, knowingly makes a negative answer,
when truth and morality, but not the law, requires an affirmative reply, such
answer perverts the authorized function of the Bureau?
Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 303 (quoting Davey, 155 F. Supp. at 178).
United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1956). Levin denied having infor-
mation as to the identity of a dinner ring when questioned by an FBI agent. The court held
that the denial was not a "statement" under section 1001. The court reasoned that such a
strict interpretation of the statute would subject anyone who told a lie during interrogation
to a possible five-year prison term. The court also noted that, even though section 1001 did
not require that the defendant be under oath when the statement was made, the penalty
under section 1001 was greater than the penalty for perjury. Therefore, to interpret section
1001 strictly "would weaken the force and purpose of the perjury statute ... Congress
could not have intended such results." Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 302-03.
10 Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 305.
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court concluded that the indictment against Paternostro should be
dismissed, holding that "the 'exculpatory no' answer without any
affirmative, aggressive or overt misstatement on the part of the
defendant does not come within the scope of the statute. 7 1
The Fifth Circuit's basis for its conclusion was not complex;
the court merely interpreted section 1001, remaining within the
bounds of the section's language and legislative purpose, and con-
cluded that the statute was not intended to punish mere "excul-
pating" denials. The reasoning of the court was similar to that of
the Stark court, and the resulting exculpatory no exception defined
by both courts was a very narrow one. Some courts have remained
within the boundaries of Paternostro. Others, including the Fifth
Circuit itself, have been unpersuaded by the pressure to remain
within these original guidelines, and have taken the exculpatory no
doctrine far beyond anything that reasonable minds could have
imagined based on the decisions in Stark or Paternostro.
B. Judicial Manipulation of the Doctrine
1. The Fifth Circuit
Although Paternostro has never been overturned, its spirit is
certainly extinct in the Fifth Circuit. The exception to section 1001
set forth in Paternostro was based on the defendant's mere excul-
patory denial that was not designed to pervert any agency func-
tion. 72 However, in a recent decision dealing with the issue, the
Fifth Circuit, while purporting to follow Paternostro, far exceeded
the limits of that prior decision. In United States v. Hajecate,3 the
defendants were indicted for a violation of section 1001 after
submitting false information on income tax returns. 74 On the part
of the form that required disclosure of any interest in foreign bank
accounts, the defendants checked "No," even though they had an
interest in an account in the Cayman Islands. 75 The court held that
'[m]ere negative responses to questions ... by an investigating
agent ... not initiated by the appellant' are not actionable under
1001.1"76 The court dismissed the section 1001 indictment on the
11 Id. at 309.
72 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
71 683 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983).
71 Id. at 896.
71 Id. at 896, 899.
76 Hajecate, 683 F.2d at 899 (quoting Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 305).
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ground that the defendants' answer was a mere negative response
to an investigative question.7 The court reasoned that the particular
question on the tax form was unlike the remainder of the form
and that its true purpose was investigative.78
Even assuming that the question was investigative in nature,
the Fifth Circuit failed to acknowledge one very important factor:
the defendants' sole purpose in placing the false entry on the form
was to protect their own assets and, consequently, to pervert an
agency function. The representation was not designed to exculpate;
the Hajecates could not have feared self-incrimination as a result
of a truthful answer, because a truthful answer would in no way
have incriminated them.7 9 Thus, while the court claimed to have
followed Paternostro, that claim is deceptive. The answer was a
mere denial, but it was a denial intended to pervert an agency
function. Under Paternostro, the Hajecate defendants would not
have been entitled to the exculpatory no exception. The dismissal
of this indictment by the Fifth Circuit flies in the face of the
congressional intent behind section 1001, which is to protect the
authorized functions of government.8 0 The act committed by the
defendants was the very type of act that section 1001 was designed
to prevent.
The Fifth Circuit made another questionable decision in United
States v. Bush.8 Defendant Bush signed two false sworn affidavits
during an investigation by IRS agents and was consequently charged
with a section 1001 violation.82 The court held that the factual
situation was "identical to the one in Paternostro .... Bush was
" Id. at 900, 901.
78 The court examined the statute authorizing the question, 31 U.S.C. § 1121 (1976)
(current version at 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1988)) and the accompanying regulation, 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.24 (1982), in reaching its conclusion. The statute allows the Secretary of the Treasury
to obtain reports concerning foreign financial affairs from any citizen or resident of the
United States. The regulation enables the Secretary to do this through federal income tax
returns. Because this reporting system is part of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, whose
purpose in keeping these records is their "'usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory inves-
tigations or proceedings,"' the court declared that the question on the form was investiga-
tive. Hajecate, 683 F.2d at 900-01.
71 The Government raised the incrimination issue in its argument. They pointed to the
Supreme Court's classification of tax form questions as "neutral on their face," since they
apply equally to everyone and do not involve "compulsion to incriminate." Id. at 900
(citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1976)).
31 Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting United
States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941)).




approached by the Internal Revenue Service, the interview was
initiated by the Internal Revenue Service, the essence of Bush's
statements were [sic] an exculpatory no to the questions asked by
the agent." 83 Citing Fifth Amendment concerns of self-incrimina-
tion,14 the court held that section 1001 did not apply to Bush's
statements and reversed the trial court, remanding the action for
dismissal. 8
The court's decision in Bush is disturbing; while the court
claims to follow Paternostro, its application of the case is manip-
ulative. The "statements" made by Bush, which the court deter-
mined were "essentially denials," were in the form of an affidavit-
replete with affirmative misrepresentations-signed by Bush.8 6 To
reach the conclusion that a full typewritten page of statements was
nothing more than a denial required some stretching of this crite-
rion by the court. Such result-oriented action is nothing more than
judicial legislation masked as interpretation.
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit is no less guilty of doctrinal manipulation
than is the Fifth Circuit. In United States v. Bedore,87 the court
reversed the conviction of defendant Bedord, 8 holding that his
misrepresentation did not fit within the class of statements that
section 1001 was intended to reach.8 9 When a process server came
to his home, Bedord identified himself as "Tom Halstead." 9 The
court held that because Bedord's statements (1) were not related
to any claim against the government, (2) were given in response to
Id. at 818.
4 This court is ... well aware ... of the Fifth Amendment ... which says,
"No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ...." If, then, under the facts before us we allow Bush's conviction
to stand, Bush will have been convicted by his own words given to an
investigating officer of the United States government ....
Id. (citing United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
Id. at 819.
16 Bush signed two separate affidavits, the first of which he was not indicted upon
because the statute of limitations had run. Bush was indicted for statements made in the
second affidavit, signed a year later. A copy of the second affidavit is reproduced in the
opinion. See Bush, 503 F.2d at 816-17.
455 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1972).
Is Bedord was evidently known under two names-Bedore and Bedord. Both are used
in the case. See id. at 1109-10.
" Id. at 1111.
10 Id. at 1110.
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a government inquiry, and (3) did not substantially impair any
agency function, his actions were not punishable under section
1001.91
The factors cited by the Ninth Circuit were essentially those
mentioned by the Paternostro court,92 except for a substantial
variation of the third criterion. The first two factors were correctly
applied by the court. Bedord's statement was not related to any
claim; he was seeking nothing. The statement was also given in
response to the inquiry of the process server; Bedord did not initiate
this communication. On the third criterion, however, the court
faltered. After reviewing the statutory history, the court concluded
that section 1001 was intended to prosecute only those statements
relating to false claims and statements that could "pervert or
corrupt the authorized functions of those agencies to whom those
statements were made." 93 Then, with no other explanation, the
court concluded that Bedord's statements were outside that scope.94
This conclusion is illogical. Bedord was not under investigation; he
had no need to exculpate himself in any manner. Furthermore, his
representation went beyond a mere denial; Bedord made a false,
affirmative misrepresentation. He not only denied his identity, he
claimed to be someone else.
The court failed to explain how it reached the conclusion that
Bedord's statement did not impair the agency's function. Because
of Bedord's misrepresentation, the process server was unable to do
the very thing that he was authorized to do-serve the subpoena.
However, the court never addressed this issue; it merely stated its
conclusion, apparently meant to be accepted a priori. The court of
appeals only thinly disguised this statutory alteration as legitimate
judicial interpretation.
After Bedore, the Ninth Circuit began to expand the list of
factors in exculpatory no analysis.95 The court ultimately created a
91 See id.
Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1962).
Bedore, 455 F.2d at 1111.
" Id.
" In United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978), the court added two
additional factors: (1) whether the inquiry by the agency was an administrative, rather than
investigative inquiry, and (2) whether the defendant could have incriminated himself by
telling the truth. Id. at 1364.
Defendant Rose was charged under section 1001 after he lied to a border agent
concerning the nature of his travels. Id. at 1363. The court affirmed the conviction,
concluding that the statement was related to a claim against the government-entry into the
country. Id. at 1364. The court further held that the statement was "material" because,
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five-part test, now known as the Medina test, in 1986.9 In United
States v. Medina de Perez,97 the court addressed the conviction of
a defendant who was charged under section 1001 for giving false
answers to a Drug Enforcement Administration officer during a
post-arrest interrogation." In its decision to reverse the conviction,
the court looked at five factors. Under the Medina test, a defendant
is entitled to the exculpatory no defense only if:
1) the defendant has no claim against the United States and seeks
no privilege; 99
2) the defendant is responding to inquiries from the agency when
making the statement;
3) the statement does not impair the authorized function of the
agency;
4) the government inquiries are not a "routine exercise of admin-
istrative responsibility"; and
5) a truthful answer would have incriminated the defendant.1°°
On its face, the Medina test appears to narrow the exculpatory
no defense. After all, the test does have five requirements, all of
which must be met in order to invoke the exculpatory no doctrine.
However, the result of Medina has instead created an ironic di-
chotomy: a test that appears strict on its face but is very lenient
in its application. For example, in United States v. Equihua-
Juarez,10 the defendant gave an alias to a Border Patrol agent in
order to conceal his prior criminal record.' °2 Using the Medina
test, the court should have affirmed the conviction because it
impaired the agent's function. However, the court held that the
defendant's statement did not impair the authorized function of
although the false statement did not actually impair the function of the Customs Service,
the statement had the "intrinsic capability" of doing so. Id. (citations omitted).
" See United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1986).
9 Id.
"Id. at 542.
- Entry into the United States is one example of a privilege. However, the Ninth
Circuit has not been consistent on the question of whether such a claim to privilege precludes
the exculpatory no under the first criterion. Compare Rose, 570 F.2d at 1364 (holding that
defendant who lied about overseas travel was claiming a privilege when trying to enter) with
Medina, 799 F.2d at 545 n.8 (holding that even though defendant was attempting to enter
the country, false statements were not sufficiently related to such claim as to preclude
exculpatory no defense).
11 Id. at 544 & n.5.
"1 851 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988).
"02 Id. at 1223.
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the agency, because the agent testified that he did not rely on the
defendant's statement.103 Therefore, the court construed the third
element of the Medina test as one of actual, rather than potential,
effect. In order to do this, the court had to ignore circuit precedent
establishing that this third element could be met by a false state-
ment with the "intrinsic capability" of perverting an agency func-
tion; actual reliance and perversion were not required.'04
Thus, despite its deceptively narrow appearance, the Medina
test is quite broad in effect. In fact, the Ninth Circuit interpretation
of the exculpatory no doctrine, which is by far the most complex,
is also considered to be among the most liberal.10 5 Such illusion is
dangerous, because it conceals the true nature of the court's ac-
tions. While Medina purports to comply with the congressional
purpose behind section 1001,10) it actually represents a judicial
departure from the bounds of statutory language and legislative
intent.
3. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have espoused Medina in both
form and application. 107 In United States v. Cogdell,lea the defen-
dant lied to a Secret Service agent concerning a fraudulently ob-
tained replacement check from the IRS.109 The Fourth Circuit held
20 Id. at 1225.
114 United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 840 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1978). The Rose decision is irreconcilable
with Equihua-Juarez. Defendant Rose told a border agent that he had not traveled overseas
when in fact he had. See Rose, 570 F.2d at 1363. However, the border agent did not rely
on that information and, consequently, the agency function was not perverted. Yet the
Ninth Circuit, citing precedent from the Third and Ninth Circuits and Pennsylvania, held
that the statement "had the 'intrinsic' capability of bringing it about," which was enough.
Id. at 1364. There is no practical difference between those factual situations. However, the
court in Equihua-Juarez failed even to mention Rose in this part of its opinion.
-0 Nicholson, supra note 26, at 240. The "liberal" courts would also include the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits, which follow Medina. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying
text.
,0 The Ninth Circuit claimed to recognize the Supreme Court's broad interpretation
of section 1001. See Medina, 799 F.2d at 543 (citing United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S.
475 (1984)); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969); United States v. Bramblett, 348
U.S. 503 (1955); see also supra note 26.
207 See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Taylor,
907 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1990).
2ot 844 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1988).
109 Id. at 180.
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that the defendant's statements met all five elements under Medina,
and reversed the defendant's conviction." 0 In order for the court
to reach this decision, it had to overcome the obstacle that the
replacement check was a "claim against the government" in vio-
lation of the first element of Medina. The court reasoned that
while the claim for the check was in fact a claim against the
government, the defendant's statements to the Secret Service agent,
made after the check was received and cashed, were not "related
to a claim against the government" under Medina."'
In United States v. Taylor,"2 the Eighth Circuit was fairly
liberal in its interpretation of Medina, reversing a defendant's
conviction for making false denials to a bankruptcy judge that the
defendant had signed some forged pleadings." 3 The court held that
such denials did not pervert the court's function, as required by
Medina, because the bankruptcy court "should not have been
overly surprised that Taylor denied guilt." '" 4 Furthermore, in order
to satisfy the Medina test, the court had to hold that the bank-
ruptcy hearing was not an exercise of "administrative responsibil-
ity," and that Taylor would have incriminated himself by admitting
that he signed the documents, despite the fact that he had a power
of attorney to do so."s
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have
chosen to abandon the original limits set forth in Paternostro,
moving on to bigger, though arguably not better, forms of analysis.
However, several circuits still abide by a more narrow view of the
exculpatory no doctrine.
C. Adherence to Strict Limits
Medina is not the law everywhere. Several circuits, refusing to
adopt the Medina rationale, have declined to join their liberal
peers' effort to redraft section 1001 through judicial exception.
These conservative circuits feel compelled to stay within the spirit
of Paternostro and therefore recognize the exculpatory no doctrine
only in limited form.
Though they have never expressly accepted or rejected the
exculpatory no doctrine, the Second and Seventh Circuits have
10 Id. at 184-85.
' Id. at 184.
907 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1990).
3 Id. at 802-03.
"4 Id. at 806.
"S Id. at 806-07.
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both expressed strong opinions as to its application. In United
States v. Capo,"16the Second Circuit stated that "any statement
beyond a simple 'no' does not fall within the [exculpatory no]
exception."117 In United States v. King,"' the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the section 1001 conviction of a defendant who made a
series of false denials to government agents in an effort to obtain
Supplemental Security Income."19 When the defendant attempted
to invoke the exculpatory no defense, the court stated that the
defense was inapplicable: "IT]he doctrine stands as a very limited
exception to section 1001 ... limited to simple negative answers
... under circumstances indicating that the defendant is unaware
that he is under investigation ... and is not making a claim or
seeking employment with the government."' 20
The Tenth Circuit likewise refused to apply the exculpatory no
doctrine in United States v. Fitzgibbon.12 1 Defendant Fitzgibbon
was indicted under section 1001 after he falsely checked a "no"
response on a customs form that inquired whether he was carrying
more than $5000. Fitzgibbon later falsely denied that he was car-
rying more than $5000 when questioned directly by customs offi-
cials.'2 The court held that a finding of possible self-incrimination,
which did not exist in the case at bar,'2 was critical to the appli-
cation of the exculpatory no exception.' 24 This requirement, also
found in the Medina test, is quite logical: if there is no possibility
for self-incrimination, then there is no need for exculpation.
The Eleventh Circuit cites Paternostro as its source of excul-
patory no interpretation,12 and the First Circuit, which has never
116 791 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1986).
7 Id. at 1069.
's 613 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1980).
"' Id. at 671-72.
1 Id. at 674-75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The defendant's attempt to
invoke the doctrine here was erroneous because his statements were made for the purpose
of supporting a claim against the government for Supplemental Security Income. Id. at 672.
1 619 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1980).
M Id. at 875.
3 It is not illegal to carry more than $5000 into the country. It is only illegal not to
report it. Therefore, Fitzgibbon would not have incriminated himself by admitting that he
was carrying the money.
2 Id. at 881.
Il See United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1986) (notary public who
disclaimed involvement in criminal activity fell under the exculpatory no exception where
her answer was essentially a denial in response to an investigative question designed to elicit
an incriminating response); United States v. Payne, 750 F.2d 844, 861 (11th Cir. 1985)
(applying the exculpatory no defense to 18 U.S.C. § 1006, which prohibits false statements
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been faced with the opportunity to accept a Paternostro-like form
of the doctrine, has indicated its predisposition to do so126
The most recent mark added to the conservative circuit court
tally is that of the Sixth Circuit in Steele II. 127 Not only did that
court reject the Medina test, but in so doing also took its liberal
peers to task by cutting through the illusory surface of the multi-
factor test and disarming the assumption on which the liberal view
is based.
III. BACK TO BAsIcs
A. The Issues Behind the Controversy-Steele II
The Steele II court addressed several issues critical to the ex-
culpatory no controversy: (1) the breadth of the statutory lan-
guage;'2 (2) the administrative/investigative distinction; 29 and (3)
Fifth Amendment concerns.3 0
1. The Statutory Language
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the breadth of the language of
section 1001. 1. However, the court responded, "we do not think
these concerns legitimize the creation of the Ninth Circuit's broad
exception to this statute.'1 2 The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the
argument that there were no realistic limits within the statute
concerning its application: "The statute does contain language
which reasonably limits its application: only 'material' statements
to Federal Land Banks, where the defendant could show that "truthful answers would have
been incriminating, or ... that he or she reasonably believed that truthful affirmative
answers would have been incriminating").
'" The First Circuit has twice stated, in dicta, that mere negative responses or denials
are not "statements" within section 1001. See United States v. Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526,
1533 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
I- Steele II, 933 F.2d 1313 (6th Cir. 1991).
2 Id. at 1321-22.
12 Id. at 1321.
11o Id. at 1320-21.
"I Id. at 1321. "[I]f read literally, [this statute] could make 'virtually any false
statement, sworn or unsworn, written or oral, made to a government employee ... a
felony."' United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting
United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1972)).
"1 Id. The Ninth Circuit's "broad exception" is the Medina test.
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are violations."'' Materiality, as it has been defined by the courts,
comports with the purpose of the statute: protecting government
functions. A statement is material under section 1001 if it has the
capability or tendency to affect or pervert a governmental func-
tion. 34
This statute was not designed to punish trivial falsehoods.
However, any statement that has the power to pervert an agency
function is exactly the kind of statement that Congress intended to
prevent. Therefore, the materiality requirement placed within the
statutory language is a reasonable limit in light of the purpose of
the statute. 3 ' The statutory language of section 1001 also requires
"knowledge" and "intent" on the part of the defendant. A party
will not be convicted under section 1001 for giving a false statement
that the defendant reasonably believed was true. 3 6 Furthermore,
Congress was relying on prosecutorial discretion to control the
statute's application:
[C]ongress appears to have relied primarily upon the discre-
tion of a prosecutor in limiting the potential application of this
section. This mechaftism-prosecutorial discretion-is a valid
means of limiting the potential application of the statute. It is
not our role to re-write a statute simply because we are discom-
forted by the manner in which Congress chose to structure its
enforcement. ... "[E]stablishment of different policies for the
M Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1321. The Sixth Circuit further noted that "the third criterion
[of the Medina test, that the statement impair the agency function,] appears superfluous in
light of the requirement of materiality .... 'Since materiality is a critical element of [section
1001], this [third criterion] seems redundant."' Id. at 1321 n.7 (quoting United States v.
Alzate-Restreppo, 890 F.2d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 1989) (Patel & Nelson, J.J., concurring in
the judgment)).
,14 Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1319 (citing United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148 (6th
Cir. 1985) and United States v. McGough, 510 F.2d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 1975)).
" Although a grammatically particular reading would reveal that the "material"
requirement modifies only the first clause of the statute, courts generally have assumed that
Congress intended for the "materiality" element to modify all three clauses in the statute
so as "to exclude trivial falsehoods from the purview of the statute." Steele II, 933 F.2d
at 1318 (quoting United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148, 1151 (6th Cir. 1985) (other
citations omitted)).
136 See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) (holding that the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's statement was made with knowledge
of its falsity). However, it should also be noted that the defendant does not have to have
knowledge of federal involvement to be convicted under section 1001. See id. at 73-74.
With regard to "intent," the prosecution must prove that the defendant had the
specific intent to make a false statement deliberately or with reckless disregard of the truth.




governmental agencies affected [in order to curb overzealous
application of section 1001] is in the executive and legislative
rather than the judicial domains.' 37
It must be conceded that Congress wrote a very broad statute,
but Congress has the power to write very broad statutes if it
chooses to do so, provided such statutes are not so broad or vague
as to offend the Constitution. 38 Furthermore, any statute designed
to protect the activities of all governmental agencies must by ne-
cessity be somewhat broad.
2. Administrative v. Investigative Functions
Those courts that follow the Medina test have placed a great
deal of emphasis on the requirement that the government agent
must have been acting in an investigative capacity for the excul-
patory no doctrine to apply. 3 9 However, the distinction actually
originated in the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bush. 40 In Bush,
the court noted that an exception to section 1001 should exist in
investigative situations "based on [the statute's] historical evolution
as a statute seeking to prevent the administration of federal gov-
ernment programs from being subverted or frustrated by the false
presentation of interested parties.''4
The distinction is often premised on the idea that an investi-
gating officer is less likely to rely on a declarant's statements than
is a government agent whose work is routinely administrative;
therefore, the function of the investigating agent is less likely to
be impaired. 142 Again, such reasoning may be theoretically sound.
"I Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1321 (quoting United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946
(5th Cir. 1974)).
" The Supreme Court has already determined that the language of section 1001,
although broad, is neither ambiguous nor unjust. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475,
484 (1984).
3 Under the fourth element of Medina, a statement will not fit within the "exculpatory
no" doctrine if that statement was in the context of "a routine exercise of administrative
responsibility." United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1986).
,40 503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974).
'41 Id. at 815.
142 Although federal regulatory schemes cannot adequately function if deterrents
to the providing of false information are not provided, it is a fundamental
premise of our criminal justice system that the detection of crimes does not
depend on assuring that the accused individuals be forced to tell the truth to
law enforcement agents.
United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 1976) (Ferguson, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). See also United States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582, 584 (S.D.N.Y.
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However, the resultant reality is that courts may strain to conclude
that an officer or agency is acting in an investigative capacity.143
Furthermore, the distinction between an administrative and inves-
tigative capacity is often blurred. 44 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit
completely rejected the dichotomy because it was simply "unhelp-
ful., "45 However, the best argument dealing with the issue came in
Steele II:
[Tihe fourth criterion [of the Medina test] fails to account
for the Supreme Court's guidance in Rodgers. The Supreme Court
expressly recognized that "[a] criminal investigation surely falls
within the meaning of 'any matter.... ."' Thus, a distinction
between an agency's administrative and investigative functions is
unwarranted. There is no reason to undertake the superfluous
analysis required by the fourth prong of this test because section
1001 applies to all agency actions, criminal or otherwise.'"
If Congress had intended to restrict section 1001 to administra-
tive agency functions, it could have easily done so. However, no
such restriction may be inferred from the statute.
3. Fifth Amendment Concerns
Undoubtedly, the most often cited reason behind the creation
of the exculpatory no doctrine is the court's concern for the pro-
tection of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 47 Under the
1959) (stating that "refusal of a suspect to affirmatively assist a criminal investigator in
preparing a case for criminal prosecution against himself has no tendency to pervert the
investigator's function").
*41 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's finding
that question on income tax form was investigative in nature).
I" "[Tihe court is confronted with an absence of explanation by the court as to what
is meant by the phrase 'routine function of administrative duty."' United States v. Marusich,
637 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D. Cal. 1986); see also United States v. Becker, 855 F.2d 644,
646 (9th Cir. 1988) ("It is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between administrative and
investigative responsibilities.").
"47 United States v. Payne, 750 F.2d 844, 863 n.21 (11th Cir. 1985).
I' Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1321 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479
(1984)). See also United States v. Payne, 750 F.2d 844, 863 n.21 (lth Cir. 1985) (rejecting
the administrative/investigative distinction because it is unhelpful).
",7 "Undoubtedly, the judicial gloss put on § 1001 by the 'exculpatory no' decisions
originates at least in part from latent distaste for an application of the statute that is
uncomfortably close to the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943,
946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Alzate-Restreppo, 890 F.2d 1061, 1069-
70 (9th Cir. 1989); (Patel & Nelson, J.J., concurring in the judgment); United States v.
Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 719 (lth Cir. 1986).
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Fifth Amendment, "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... 141 However:
Fifth Amendment concerns ... fail to justify [the Medina
test]. An individual has a constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination, but he has no constitutional right to give an un-
truthful statement .... "A citizen may decline to answer the
question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity
knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood.' 49
The Fifth Amendment does not give a person the right to lie.
While some courts have claimed that section 1001 creates a "Hob-
son's choice" for a defendant in an investigative interrogation-in
other words, "confess or be charged with a section 1001 felony,"-
this dilemma does not in fact exist. The individual always has the
option to remain silent.5 0
[Section 1001] does not usher a heads we win, tails you lose
philosophy into the criminal justice system. ("If you tell our
version of the truth, we will call it an admission and use it against
you on the substantive offense; If you tell us something which
materially varies from our version of the truth, we will charge
you with a § 1001 felony"). ... The coin fortunately is three
sided. The accused can say nothing or plead the Fifth Amendment
and that action cannot be used against him in a federal proceed-
ing.' 5'
In light of a "realistic" view of investigative questioning, the
language of the Sixth Circuit may seem a bit harsh. It is often
pointed out that any answer of silence in a post-arrest interrogation
will be deemed as guilt by the investigator. 5 2 However, that is not
ample justification for the defendant to launch into a response
replete with falsehoods. The Fifth Amendment only provides that
the defendant will not be forced to be a witness against himself; it
does not say that the Constitution will provide every opportunity
for a guilty defendant to evade detection.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1320 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 74
(1969)).
110 Id. at 1320-21.
"I United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 821 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1976) (Ferguson, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975)).
112 "[A]ny appreciation of the communicative realities must lead to the recognition
that standing mute in the face of questions is an exceedingly unnatural response and that
'taking the fifth' has been so often accompanied by social ostracism that it is an unwhole-
some option." Id. at 822 n.2.
[VoL,. 81
EXCULPATORY No
Nonetheless, no court that has dealt with the exculpatory no
doctrine has ever suggested that defendants who merely deny their
guilt in fear of self-incrimination should not be protected by the
exculpatory no defense. In fact, even the Sixth Circuit has sug-
gested that such an application might be acceptable.1 3 However,
such an exception need not be based on Fifth Amendment grounds.
It is easily argued, successfully in Paternostro, that such statements
merely do not fall within the purview of section 1001.154
B. A Suitable Alternative
It is time to return to basics. Since its origin in Stark and
Paternostro, the exculpatory no doctrine has been stretched and
pulled well beyond reasonable bounds. Although the federal courts
claim to respect the power and intention of the legislature, many
of them have clearly strayed beyond the limits of separation of
powers.
Many of the standards on which exculpatory no analysis has
been premised are inappropriate. Furthermore, courts have mis-
applied those standards, manipulating the law to reach the desired
result. Many courts are clearly uncomfortable with section 1001,
and have in effect rewritten the statute through the device of
exception. Such action surpasses the constitutional bounds of the
judiciary's power. The authority to legislate belongs to Congress.
The Supreme Court has already addressed the constitutionality of
section 1001, and the statute remains viable. Courts do not have
to like the statute, but they must respect Congress' power to create
the statute.
The Sixth Circuit was correct in rejecting the exculpatory no
defense as applied in Medina. The reasons supporting the doctrine
simply do not justify the breadth it has been given in more liberal
circuits. The appropriate application of the doctrine is both feasible
and simple: except only those statements that are denials and only
if those denials were given in light of a reasonable fear of self-
incrimination. Once a defendant insists on embellishing that denial
with affirmative misrepresentations, he or she is no longer pro-
153 See Steele II, 933 F.2d at 1319-20. The Steele II court recognized the exception
made in Paternostro where the defendant merely denied guilt. However, the facts in Steele
H were not so simple; Steele's actions were more than mere denials. Therefore, the court
was not faced with an opportunity to accept the doctrine as it had been used in Paternostro.
'0' United States v. Paternostro, 311 F.2d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 1962). The court stated
that "the 'exculpatory no' answer without any affirmative, aggressive or overt misstatement
on the part of the defendant does not come within the scope of the statute ......
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tected by the exculpatory no doctrine or by the Fifth Amendment,
and the application of section 1001 is appropriate. Such an inter-
pretation would comport with the legislative history and recognized
purpose of the statute, and would return the exculpatory no doc-
trine to its limited origins.
CONCLUSION
The exculpatory no controversy is ripe for review by the Su-
preme Court and Congress. Thirty years of inconsistency and con-
fusion is enough. In the interim, however, the circuits must speak
to the issue themselves. The Sixth Circuit, through Steele II, has
done so, rejecting the examples set by other circuits and choosing
to follow the guidelines set forth by the legislative authors in the
statutory language. Other circuits should follow suit and stop re-
writing the rule by expanding the exception.
Sandra L. Turner
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